The ambiguity of transparency in international organizations
This book project explores the benefits and unintended consequences of transparency in international organizations. It argues that, under specific conditions, process transparency risks pushing intergovernmental negotiations to more obscure venues as governments seek to shield their deliberations from public backlash. The argument is tested using the case of negotiations in the Council of the EU and the United Nations Security Council. This project benefits from funding from the Hertie School, the LSE Covid fund, LSE STICERD, LSE’s European Institute, and Princeton University’s Liechtenstein Institute for Self-Determination. Preliminary findings featured on NRC Handelsblad. A first article on the EU Council can be found here.
People and International Politics in Post-War Europe (with Chris Anderson and Stephanie Hofmann)
What lessons do citizens draw from experiencing major armed conflicts, and how do they think about international politics in their immediate aftermath? When war is a recent rather than a distant memory, do people have coherent ideas about newly emerging tensions and the best ways to ensure peace, security, and stability going forward? This project aims to exploit a trove of previously unused public surveys conducted on behalf of the U.S. Department of State in several European countries between 1945 until 1970. These surveys regularly asked random samples of citizens about their perceptions of the intensifying Cold War, heir attitudes toward former warring parties, newly established international organizations, and their views on a new European security architecture. The project benefits from funds from the CIVICA consortium.
Taming of the shrews: Decentralized norm enforcement in the European Council (with Lucas Schramm)
The European Council is one of the European Union’s most dynamic decision-making bodies. Both scholars and practitioners attribute its effectiveness to an informal norm of diffuse reciprocity, which discourages governments from abusing their veto power. We explore why and how the European Council upholds this norm, despite frequent temptations to violate it and exploit its inherent ambiguity.